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Abstract
Distributed Artificial Intelligence systems, in which multiple agents interact to improve their
individual performance and to enhance the system’s overall utility, are becoming an increasingly
pervasive means of conceptualising a diverse range of applications. As the discipline matures,
researchers are beginning to strive for the underlying theories and principles which guide the
central processes of coordination and cooperation. Here agent communities are modelled using a
distributed goal search formalism and it is argued that commitments (pledges to undertake a
specified course of action) and conventions (means of monitoring commitments in changing
circumstances) are the foundation of coordination in multi-agent systems. An analysis of existing
coordination models which use concepts akin to commitments and conventions is undertaken
before a new unifying framework is presented. Finally a number of prominent coordination
techniques which do not explicitly involve commitments or conventions are reformulated in these
terms to demonstrate their compliance with the central hypothesis of this paper.
1 Introduction
As more challenging applications are automated, so the size and complexity of software systems
becomes greater. However this process cannot continue indefinitely; already researchers from a
variety of disciplines have noted that present generation intelligent systems are nearing the
2boundaries of current software engineering approaches and that a fundamental shift of paradigm
is required (Cox, 1990; Lenat and Feigenbaum, 1991; McDermott, 1990; Stefik, 1986).
Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI) is one of these new approaches. It aims to construct
systems composed of multiple problem solving entities which interact with one another to
enhance their performance. With this “divide and conquer” approach the scope of each
component is limited, meaning the complexity of the computation is lower, thus enabling the
processing elements to be simpler and more reliable. This increased demand on software systems
has also coincided with important advances in hardware technology for processor fabrication and
for inter-processor communication - meaning it is now economically feasible and technically
viable to connect together large numbers of powerful, yet inexpensive, processing units that
execute asynchronously.
Decentralised and cooperative problem solving systems have been advocated as a means of:
increasing the level of information integration across organisations (Pan and Tenenbaum, 1991;
Papazoglou et al., 1992; Shina, 1991); overcoming the limitations on intelligence present in any
finite artificial system (March and Simon, 1958; Minsky 1985; Simon, 1957); developing
sophisticated applications (Jennings and Wittig, 1992; Neches et al., 1991) and providing a more
natural representation of distributed problems1 (eg sensor networks (Lesser and Corkill, 1983), air
traffic control (Cammarata et al., 1983), information retrieval (Huhns et al., 1988) and electricity
networks (Jennings et al., 1992)). Other potential advantages include: reusability of problem
solving components by incorporating the same system into several cooperating communities, an
increased set or scope of achievable tasks by sharing resources, improved system robustness by
undertaking duplicate tasks using different methods, enhanced problem solving due to the
combination of multiple problem solving paradigms and sources of information and problem
solving speed up due to parallel execution (Bond and Gasser, 1988; Durfee et al., 1987; Gasser
and Huhns, 1989; Huhns, 1988).
1. It has even been suggested that all real problems are distributed (Hayes-Roth, 1980)
3In DAI systems, agents are grouped together to form communities which cooperate to achieve
the goals of the individuals and of the system as a whole. This review concentrates on agents which
possess a range of identifiable problem solving capabilities, have their own aims and objectives,
are relatively autonomous in deciding what actions to perform and can reason about the process of
coordination. These characteristics debar some well known networks of cooperating entities
including ACTORS (Agha, 1986), BEINGS (Lenat, 1975) and neural networks (McClelland and
Rumelhart, 1986). In all of these systems, cooperative behaviour stems from predefined
interactions between tightly coupled, simple processing elements. Each individual has little
knowledge of the system’s overall objective or of general strategies for communication and
coordination. Therefore the agents cannot perform meaningful problem solving in their own right
nor can they operate outside of the specific cooperation protocols specified in advance by the
system designer.
In the majority of multi-agent systems, community members have problem solving expertise
which is related, but distinct, and which frequently has to be coordinated when solving problems.
Such interactions are needed because of the dependencies between agents’ actions, the necessity
of meeting global constraints and because no one individual has sufficient competence, resources
or information to solve the entire problem.
Interdependence occurs when goals undertaken by individual agents are related - either because
local decisions made by one agent have an impact on the decisions of other community members
(eg when building a house, decisions about the size and location of rooms impacts upon the wiring
and plumbing) or because of the possibility of harmful interactions amongst agents (eg two mobile
robots may attempt to pass through a narrow exit simultaneously, resulting in a collision, damage
to the robots and blockage of the exit).
Global constraints exist when the solution being developed by a group of agents must satisfy
certain conditions if it is to be deemed successful. For instance a house building team may have a
budget of £250,000, a distributed monitoring system may have to react to critical events within 30
4seconds and a distributed air traffic control system may have to control the planes with a fixed
communication bandwidth. If individual agents acted in isolation and merely tried to optimise their
local performance, then such overarching constraints are unlikely to be satisfied. Only through
coordinated action will acceptable solutions be developed.
Finally many problems cannot be solved by individuals working in isolation because they do
not possess the necessary expertise, resources or information. Relevant examples include the tasks
of lifting a heavy object, driving in a convoy and playing a symphony. It may be impractical or
undesirable to permanently synthesize the necessary components into a single entity because of
historical, political, physical or social constraints, therefore temporary alliances through
cooperative problem solving may be the only way to proceed. Differing expertise may need to be
combined to produce a result outside of the scope of any of the individual constituents (eg in
medical diagnosis, knowledge about heart disease, blood disorders and respiratory problems may
need to be combined to diagnose a patient’s illness). Different agents may have different resources
(eg processing power, memory and communications) which all need to be harnessed to solve a
complex problem. Different agents may have different information or viewpoints of a problem (eg
in concurrent engineering systems, the same product may be viewed from a design, manufacturing
and marketing perspective).
Even when individuals can work independently, meaning coordination is not essential,
information discovered by one agent can be of sufficient use to another that the two agents can
solve the problem more than twice as fast. For example when searching for a lost object in a large
area it is often better, though not essential, to do so as a team. Analysis of this “combinatorial
implosion” phenomena (Hewitt and Kornfield, 1980) has resulted in the postulation that
cooperative search, when sufficiently large, can display universal characteristics which are
independent of the nature of either the individual processes or the particular domain being tackled
(Clearwater et al., 1991).
This paper does not aim to provide comprehensive coverage of the entire field of DAI - such
5reviews can be found in (Bond and Gasser, 1988; Chaib-Draa et al., 1992; Decker, 1987; Durfee
et al., 1989; Gasser, 1991/92a; Hern, 1988). Rather the objective is to carry out an in-depth analysis
on work related to coordinating the problem solving of multiple agents which is one of the central
problems of DAI research. At present there are a diverse range of techniques which can and do
facilitate coordination in DAI systems. However these mechanisms vary considerably in their time
horizon, the level of predictive information they provide, the computational overhead they require
and the assumptions they make about an agent’s architecture and mental state.
To develop better and more integrated models of coordination, and hence improve the
efficiency and utility of DAI systems, it is necessary to obtain a deeper understanding of the
fundamental concepts which underpin agent interactions. Here a distributed goal search formalism
is used to characterise DAI systems and a unifying coordination model is presented which has the
notions of commitment and convention at its core (section three). Commitments are viewed as
pledges to undertake a specified course of action, while conventions provide a means of monitoring
commitments in changing circumstances. The former provide a degree of predictability so that
agents can take the (future) activities of others into consideration when dealing with inter-agent
dependencies, global constraints or resource utilization conflicts. The latter provide the flexibility
which cooperating agents need if they are to cope with being situated in dynamic environments. To
operate effectively when the external world and their own beliefs are constantly changing, agents
must possess a mechanism for evaluating whether existing commitments are still valid.
Conventions provide this mechanism: defining the conditions under which commitments should be
re-assessed and specifying the associated actions which should be undertaken in such situations.
This new model of coordination is founded upon the “Centrality of Commitments and
Conventions Hypothesis” which states that: all coordination mechanisms can ultimately be
reduced to (joint) commitments and their associated (social) conventions. To provide a context for
the new framework a number of extant coordination models, which use concepts akin to
commitments and conventions, are discussed (section two). This review identifies the important
6intuitions which need to be captured and highlights the inconsistent and often informal way in
which the key notions are presently used. Finally section four investigates three prominent models
of coordination (organisational structuring, meta-level information exchange and multi-agent
planning) which do not make explicit use of commitments or conventions, and shows how they can
all be reformulated in these terms - thus providing further evidence for the main claim of this paper.
2 An Analysis of Commitments and Conventions in Extant Coordination Models
Participation in any social situation should be both simultaneously constraining, in that agents must
make a contribution to it, and yet enriching, in that participation provides resources and
opportunities which would otherwise be unavailable (Gerson, 1976). Coordination, the process by
which an agent reasons about its local actions and the (anticipated) actions of others to try and
ensure the community acts in a coherent manner, is the key to achieving this objective. Without
coordination the benefits of decentralised problem solving vanish and the community may quickly
degenerate into a collection of chaotic, incohesive individuals. Coordination aims to ensures that
all necessary portions of the overall problem are included in the activities of at least one agent, that
agents interact in a manner which permits their activities to be developed and integrated into an
overall solution, that team members act in a purposeful and consistent manner and that all of these
objectives are achievable within the available computational and resource limitations (Lesser and
Corkill, 1987). Specific examples include supplying timely information to needy agents, ensuring
actions are synchronised and avoiding redundant problem solving.
When viewing agents from a purely behaviouristic (external) perspective, it is, in general,
impossible to determine whether they have coordinated their actions. Firstly actions may be
incoherent even if the agents tried to coordinate their behaviour. This may occur, for example,
because their models of each other or of the environment are incorrect. For example, robot1 may
see robot2 heading for exit2 and, based on this observation and the subsequent deduction that it will
use this exit, decide to use exit1. However if robot2 is heading towards exit2 to pick up a particular
item and actually intends to use exit1 then there may be incoherent behaviour (both agents
7attempting to use the same exit) although there was coordination. Secondly even if there is coherent
action, it may not be as a consequence of coordination. For example imagine a group of people are
sitting in a park (Searle, 1990). As a result of a sudden downpour all of them run to a tree in the
middle of the park because it is the only available source of shelter. This is uncoordinated
behaviour because each person has the intention of stopping themselves from becoming wet and
even if they are aware of what others are doing and what their goals are, it does not affect their
action. This contrasts with the situation in which the people are dancers and the choreography calls
for them to converge on a common point (the tree). In this case the individuals are performing
exactly the same actions as before, but it is coordinated behaviour because they each have the aim
of meeting at the central point as a consequence of the overall aim of executing the dance. For these
two reasons, coordination is best studied by examining the mental state of the individual agents.
The exact make up of this mental state is still the subject of much debate, however there is an
emerging consensus on the fact that it contains beliefs, desires, goals and commitments
(intentions).
If all the agents could have complete knowledge of the goals, actions and interactions of their
fellow community members and could also have infinite processing power, it would be possible to
know exactly what each agent was doing at present and what it is intending to do in the future. In
such instances, it would be possible to avoid conflicting and redundant efforts and systems could
be perfectly coordinated (Malone, 1987). However such complete knowledge is infeasible, in any
community of reasonable complexity, because bandwidth limitations make it impossible for agents
to be constantly informed of all developments. Even in modestly sized communities, a complete
analysis to determine the detailed activities of each agent is impractical - the computation and
communication costs of determining the optimal set and allocation of activities far outweighs the
improvement in problem solving performance (Corkill and Lesser, 1986).
As all community members cannot have a complete and accurate perspective of the overall
system, the next easiest way of ensuring coherent behaviour is to have one agent with a wider
8picture. This global controller could then direct the activities of the others, assign agents to tasks
and focus problem solving to ensure coherent behaviour. However such an approach is often
impractical in realistic applications because even keeping one agent informed of all the actions in
the community would swamp the available bandwidth. Also the controller would become a severe
communication bottleneck and would render the remaining components unusable if it failed.
To produce systems without bottlenecks and which exhibit graceful degradation of
performance, most DAI research has concentrated on developing communities in which both
control and data are distributed. Distributed control means that individuals have a degree of
autonomy in generating new actions and in deciding which tasks to do next. When designing such
systems it is important to ensure that agents spend the bulk of their time engaged on solving the
domain level problems for which they were built, rather than in communication and coordination
activities. To this end, the community should be decomposed into the most modular units
possible. However the designer should ensure that these units are of sufficient granularity to
warrant the overhead inherent in goal distribution - distributing small tasks can prove more
expensive than performing them in one place (Durfee et al., 1987; Wesson et al., 1981).
The disadvantage of distributing control and data is that knowledge of the system’s overall state
is dispersed throughout the community and each individual has only a partial and imprecise
perspective. Thus there is an increased degree of uncertainty about each agent’s actions, meaning
that it more difficult to attain coherent global behaviour - for example agents may spread
misleading and distracting information, multiple agents may compete for unshareable resources
simultaneously, agents may unwittingly undo the results of each others activities and the same
actions may be carried out redundantly. Also the dynamics of such systems can become extremely
complex, giving rise to nonlinear oscillations and chaos (Huberman and Hogg, 1988). In such cases
the coordination process becomes correspondingly more difficult as well as more important2.
To ensure agents can reason about how their actions will contribute to the collective problem
solving effort and how they can benefit from interactions with others, a number of models of
9coordination have been developed. This section concentrates on those models which explicitly
involve concepts similar to commitments and conventions - initially reviewing models which
define individual behaviour (section 2.1), before moving onto models for social behaviour
(section 2.2).
2.1 Models of Individual Behaviour
There have been many attempts to define the behaviour of rational problem solvers through the
notion of intentions (Becker, 1960; Bratman, 1984; Dennett, 1987; Searle, 1983). Like many other
folk psychology concepts, the term “intention” has been given various interpretations, although
most of them have the concept of commitment at their core. The notion of commitment is given
such prominence because it is central to three aspects of an agent’s practical reasoning process
(Bratman, 1984). Firstly as agents are resource bounded, they cannot continually weigh their
competing desires and their associated beliefs in deciding what to do next. At some point, the
agent must just settle on one state of affairs for which to aim, thus creating a commitment to obtain
that objective. Secondly commitments are needed to plan and coordinate future actions. Once a
future action has been decided upon, the agent must make subsequent decisions within the context
that it will perform the said action. In a social environment, agents use knowledge of their
acquaintances’ commitments to determine what actions they will perform so that their own
actions can be organised to achieve the best results for themselves and for the community. Finally,
commitments pose problems for means-end analysis; they provide a high-level goal for which the
agent must find a suitable course of action.
However as well as embodying commitment, many of the definitions of intentions also
intertwine notions about tracking commitments (conventions) so that the two concepts become
2. Similar experiences have also been noted in organisational science: the greater the task uncertainty, the greater the
amount of information which must be processed among decision makers during task execution in order to achieve a
given level of performance (Galbraith, 1973).
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virtually indistinguishable. To clarify the situation, several prominent models of individual
intentions are reviewed and placed within the commitment plus convention framework.
The most comprehensive attempt to formalise individual intentions is due to Cohen and
Levesque (1990). Their model has two levels of detail; a fundamental one which provides the
primitives for a theory of action (eg definitions of beliefs, goals and action) and a second layer
which builds upon these concepts to develop a theory of rational action. At the second layer they
capture the notion of commitment by defining a persistent goal. Agent A has a persistent goal to
achieve objective G, relative to its motivation M, if and only if the following conditions prevail: (i)
A believes that G is currently false; (ii) A wants G to be eventually true; (iii) this state of affairs
will continue until A comes to believe either that G is true or that it will never be true or that M is
false3. An intention is then defined as a commitment to act in a certain mental state: agent A
intends to do action G if it has the persistent goal to have done that action and, moreover, to have
done it believing throughout that it was doing it.
Persistent goals embody ideas related to both commitments and conventions, which has led to
claims that their definition is circular (Singh, 1992). This problem could be avoided if the two
concepts were separated out - commitments defined as a primitive notion and then associated
conventions specified to operate on them (see figure 1 for an example). The close interweaving of
commitments and notions of rationality restricts the generality of the system. For example, it is
not possible to model an agent which fanatically follows a goal until it is satisfied. This is because
their “realism” constraint on the semantics of the underlying GOAL operator requires that if an
agent comes to believe that it will never achieve its objective, then it must drop its persistent goal
(i.e. under no circumstances can it remain committed). Adopting the advocated demarcation
3. Other authors have suggested different situations in which commitments may be dropped - these include allowing
agents to keep goals so long as they believe the objective is still viable and allowing agents to remain committed so
long as they still desire the objective (Rao and Georgeff, 1991), or allowing commitments to be dropped if more
highly rated, but conflicting, alternatives become available (Galliers, 1988).
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would also mean that the notion of commitment remains consistent in all situations; different
types of social system can then be represented simply by changing the relevant convention.
Pollack’s (1990) model of problem solving has two components, one related to an agent’s
beliefs and another to its intentions. In this work, intentions are given no finer structure nor formal
semantics - they are merely defined in an intuitive manner without reference to notions such as
commitment, stability or consistency. For agent A to have a plan to (intend to) do G that consists
of doing actions P, A must have the following beliefs: (i) A must believe that executing the actions
in P, in their specified temporal order, will entail performance of G; (ii) A must believe that each
pi in P plays a role in the plan. Thus A believes that by doing pi it will do G or some other action
Q that plays a role in its plan, or that doing pi will enable doing G or some other Q that plays a
role in the plan. The former corresponds to generator relationships and the latter to enablement. If
action a generates action b then the agent only need do a and b will automatically be done.
However when a enables b, the agent needs to do something more than a to guarantee that b will
be done. For example, knowing the phone number of a pizza store enables a pizza to be ordered, if
there is access to a phone, but it does not generate the order.
Pollack claims these beliefs are necessary but not sufficient conditions to guarantee that doing
CONVENTION: Cohen-Levesque-Model
REASONS FOR RE-ASSESSING COMMITMENT:
Commitment by agent A to goal G relative to motivation M
• A BELIEVES G IS TRUE
• A NO LONGER BELIEVES G WILL BECOME TRUE
• A NO LONGER HOLDS MOTIVATION M
ACTIONS:
R1: IF COMMITMENT SATISFIED OR
COMMITMENT UNATTAINABLE OR
MOTIVATION FOR COMMITMENT NO LONGER PRESENT
THEN CONSIDER DROPPING COMMITMENT
Figure 1: Convention for Cohen and Levesque’s Model
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P is A’s plan to do G. For sufficiency, it is also necessary for A to have a certain set of “intentions”
with respect to P. In particular A must intend: (iii) to execute each pi in P in the specified temporal
order; (iv) to execute P as a way of doing G (this circumvents the problem of accidently carrying
out an action which succeeds in bringing about the desired outcome); (v) that each pi in P plays a
role in the plan (A must intend by doing pi to do G or some other Q that plays a role in its plan or
by doing pi to enable doing G or some other Q that plays a role).
There is clearly a close link between the second and fifth conditions of this formulation. The
distinction between merely knowing of a sequence of steps which will achieve a particular
objective and actually intending to follow this sequence ensures that having the beliefs described
in condition (ii) does not imply having the intention described in (v). However it is unclear as to
whether having the intention in condition (v) necessarily means holding the beliefs in condition
(ii). There is literature to support both views: (a) plans normally support expectations of their
successful execution (Audi, 1973); (b) I may intend to make ten legible copies of what I am
writing by pressing hard on carbon paper, without believing with any confidence that I may
succeed (Davidson, 1980). Adopting the former view means that (v) directly entails (ii), and also
that (iv) entails (i); adopting the latter requires both aspects to be explicitly present. Pollack
adopts the latter view because it is useful when an inferring agent deems an actor’s plan invalid to
determine whether this is through belief in the plan action per se or whether it is due to
incompatible beliefs.
Although this work represents an important contribution to the field of plan inference, in that
it stresses the central role of mental attitudes alongside plan structure, from the view of
controlling agent activity it contains many flaws. Most importantly, the notion of intention is
stated only informally, and the interpretation which most readily springs to mind is that of
commitment. There is no notion of convention - thus the model does not adequately explain how
an agent should behave if things go wrong. For example, if an agent no longer believes it is
capable of executing an action, what should it do? Should it give up? Should it replan? This
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formalism, simply states that the agent no longer has P as a plan.
Werner (1989) outlines a general theoretical framework for designing agents with a
communicative and social competence. An important aspect of his agent model is the idea of an
“intentional state” which represents the set of strategies an agent can use to guide its actions. This
intentional state can be abstractly defined by the use of social roles. For example in a master-slave
interaction, the role of the master contains an expectation that it will tell the slave what to do and
the role of the slave carries the expectation that it will follow the master’s instructions. Although
roles are clearly a form of commitment, in that they represent a pledge to act in a certain manner,
it is unclear exactly what agents are committing themselves to since there is no representation of
either a goal or a common plan. Hence it is difficult to determine what it means for an agent to
employ a particular strategy in both theoretical and computational terms. As another example, the
contract-net cooperation protocol (Smith and Davis, 1981), in which agents bid to undertake tasks
advertised by a manager node, has two roles: rolmanager and rolcontractor. Again Werner only
provides a textual description of what the roles are and what it means to adopt a particular role,
meaning that it is difficult to assess what level of commitment is implied by undertaking a
particular role. Although roles are designed to be used in social environments they only specify
the mental states of individuals, there is no notion of group. Finally no mechanisms are provided
for reassessing commitments, meaning that once a role is adopted it must be adhered to
indefinitely.
The first two models concentrate on defining commitments and conventions which are
applicable in asocial situations, while the third model defines a purely individualistic perspective
on social actions. This work is relevant because in any multi-agent system there will be some
goals which are worked on by individuals and which will be unrelated to the activities of others.
In such cases, asocial commitments and conventions are sufficient for describing an agent’s
behaviour. However to express the full richness of interactions which are possible in a social
context, formulations specifically conceived for collaborative problem solving are required
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(Gilbert, 1989; Power, 1984).
2.2 Models of Social Behaviour
This subsection investigates several coordination models which explicitly deal with concepts such
as joint goals, joint actions, joint commitments or social conventions. The models are divided into
three main categories: (i) formal models which describe social actions from the viewpoint of the
participating individuals; (ii) formal models which describe social actions using descriptions of
teams and joint goals as primitive concepts; (iii) computational models of social behaviour.
2.2.1 Formal Models, Individualistic Perspective
Grosz and Sidner (1990) propose a special operator, called a SharedPlan, for describing
collaborative problem solving between a group of agents a1,.... an which are attempting to achieve
a particular objective G. SharedPlans require the following to be mutually believed4 for each
subgoal of G: (i) one team member (ai ε a1,....an) is capable of executing the action; (ii) ai
“intends” to achieve the subgoal; (iii) ai intends to achieve G “BY” performing the subgoal.
Agents also need to have mutual belief about the generator relationships (see section 2.1) between
sub-goals and how they lead to achievement of the parent goal. An example is that the sub-goals
of lifting at opposite ends of a heavy object will result in (generate) achievement of the
overarching goal of lifting that object if they are carried out simultaneously.
In this formalism the notion of intention is not rigourously defined, intuitively it is used to
represent the concept of commitment. Even ignoring this shortcoming, a number of conceptual
problems still remain. Firstly the important notion of BY, which links a subgoal to its parent, is
given no formal semantics and can result in counter intuitive observations. In the description of a
collaborative lift the following clause appears: INTEND(a1, BY(lift(end1), lift(heavy-object))),
4. Mutual belief is the infinite conjunction of beliefs about other agents’ beliefs about other agents’ beliefs and so on
to any depth about some proposition (Halpern, 1986).
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there is a similar clause for a2 lifting at end2. This statement is clearly nonsense, the heavy object
will not be moved by a1 lifting at end1, rather it will only happen if a2 also lifts at end2
simultaneously. This problem arises because of the lack of the overarching concept of a joint goal,
a possibility explicitly ruled out by the insistence that agents can only intend their own actions.
Secondly a myriad of different generator relationships are required for each and every possible
interrelationship between goals and sub-goals - one for simultaneous actions, one for conjoined
actions, one for sequences of actions, and so on.
In a refinement of this work, BY is replaced by a “CONTRIBUTES” relation and generator
relationships are replaced by mutually believed sequences of action with a known outcome
(Lochbaum et al., 1990). Action sequences can encode various goal interrelationships and remove
the need to produce different generator relationships for each type of constraint. CONTRIBUTES
allows a more natural expression of goal-subgoal relationships. Returning to the collaborative lift
example, a1 believes that: INTEND(a1, lift(end1)) and that CONTRIBUTES(lift(end1), a1,
lift(heavy-object)). Although these modifications are an improvement, the formalism does not
allow joint goals to be represented, nor is there any indication of when commitments should be
reassessed and how to act towards others if the decision is to renege.
Tuomela and Miller (1988) propose we-intentions (eg “we shall do G”) as a means of
describing collaborative situations. They believe that in order to study social action, it is necessary
to have a clear idea about the internalisation of the notion of “group” in its members. We-
Intentions are the basis of the sociality inherent in acting together; thus if an agent intentionally
performs a helpful act, but does not share the relevant group intention expressing the overall
common goal, then it cannot be considered as part of the joint action. Agent ai is a member of a
group which we-intends to do G if: (i) ai intends to do its part of G; (ii) ai believes that the joint
action opportunities for G are true, especially that at least a sufficient number of the full-fledged
and adequately informed members of the group, as required for the performance of G, will do
their part; (iii) ai believes there is mutual belief amongst group members to the effect that the
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preconditions of success mentioned above hold true.
As with previous formalisms, intends is informally used to represent the notion of
commitment. The second component of the we-intentions definition highlights the shortcoming of
Lochbaum et al.’s “CONTRIBUTES” relation. Unlike the SharedPlan relation, it expresses the
strong interdependence of individual intentions when agents are working together and it also
highlights the crucial role which commitments play in social actions. Actions only contribute to
the overall objective when they are considered in conjunction with those of others, there can be no
absolute contribution to a group action if strong inter-goal dependencies exist. Commitments
ensure there is sufficient trust in the belief that the other agents will do their part for an individual
to fulfill its part of G.
Like the SharedPlan work, this analysis attempts to reduce collective behaviour to individual
commitments plus beliefs. There is no attempt to explicitly represent the total social action G,
only the subparts performed by the agent in question appear in the definition. Such formulations
are subject to counter examples of the following form: consider a musician in an orchestra who
intends to perform his part of the overall action properly, but nevertheless intends to do something
which will make the visiting conductor look ridiculous and will spoil the orchestra’s overall
performance. Such a musician cannot be said to we-intend to play the symphony even though it
intends to perform an act which brings the shared objective closer. Rather than make use of the
notion of a joint intention, in which this problem could not arise, Tuomela and Miller place a very
strong interpretation on the “intends to do its part” aspect of the formulation. They require that an
not only agent accepts “I shall do my part of G” as being true of itself, but also the stronger
statement that “we shall do G”. The latter part of this definition is not formalised.
Although Tuomela and Miller acknowledge that commitments can be broken and that this can
affect the whole group; they simply state that when things go wrong with one agent’s activities,
the other group members will help exert pressure and do whatever they think is necessary for the
collective to succeed in achieving its objective. They have no convention which defines “go
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wrong” nor any conceptualisation of “do whatever they think is necessary for the collective to
succeed.”
Cohen and Levesque (1991a) formulate joint commitment through the definition of joint
persistent goals which, in turn, are based upon the concept of achievement goals. Achievement
goals define the state of individuals participating in a team which is working towards a common
objective with a specified motivation. Agent ai has a weak achievement goal, relative to its
motivation M, to bring about G if either of the following are true: (i) ai does not yet believe that G
has been achieved and has G being eventually true as a goal (i.e. ai has a normal achievement goal
to bring about G); (ii) ai believes that G is true, will never be true or is irrelevant (M is false), but
has a goal of making the status of G mutually believed by all team members. A team of agents has
a joint persistent goal, relative to M, to achieve G if and only if: they mutually believe that G is
currently false; they mutually believe that they all want G to be eventually true and until they
come to mutually believe either that G is true, that G will never be true or that M is false, they will
continue to mutually believe that they each have G as a weak achievement goal relative to M5.
If a team is jointly committed to achieving G, they mutually believe that they each have G as a
normal achievement goal initially. However as time passes, team members cannot rely on the fact
that they all still have G as a normal achievement goal; they can only assume that they have it as a
weak achievement goal. The reason for this weaker statement is that one team member may have
discovered that the goal is finished (impossible or irrelevant) and may be in the process of making
this fact known to its associates. If at some point it is no longer mutually believed that everybody
has the normal achievement goal, then there is no longer a joint persistent goal as not all the
agents wish G to be true. Thus the team is no longer jointly committed to G. However a weak
achievement goal persists and ensures that all team members are informed of the lack of
5. In their account of confirmations in task-oriented dialogues, a number of slight variations in the definitions of both
individual and joint commitments are presented (Cohen and Levesque, 1991b). Also included in this work are a
variety of conventions for monitoring the execution of joint intentions.
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commitment by the doubting individual. This means agents can rely upon the commitments of
others; firstly to the overall objective and then, if necessary, to the mutual belief of the status of
the objective (Levesque et al., 1991). Individuals can therefore undertake activities in the
knowledge that others are working towards the same overall objective and that if something goes
awry then they will be informed. A joint intention for a team of agents to achieve G, relative to
their motivation M, occurs when all the members have a joint persistent goal relative to M of their
having done G and, moreover, having done it mutually believing throughout that they were doing
it.
Like their work on individual intentions, the concept of a joint persistent goal contains both
the notion of commitment and also a convention which explains how to monitor it. The model of
commitment hardwires a set of conditions under which commitments can be dropped and
specifies a definitive code of conduct for how to behave towards others in the team when
commitments are reneged upon. A further disadvantage of this model is that there is no explicit
representation of collectives - actions and goals are defined solely in terms of individuals.
2.2.2 Formal Models, Societal Perspective
Many of the problems with the models discussed in the previous sub-section occur because they
attempt to define cooperative behaviour in terms of individual goals. An alternative approach
adopted by several researchers is to acknowledge that joint goals are a primitive concept in their
own right. That is, joint goals cannot be analysed solely in terms of individual goals, even if the
individual goals are supplemented with beliefs about the related goals of other agents6. The
reason for this belief is that the former imply the notion of cooperation whereas the latter do not.
Even if two agents possess the same individual goal, and they are both mutually aware of this fact,
6. This position is consistent with the symbolic interactionist school of sociological thought which adheres to the view
that joint action is the fundamental unit of society (Mead, 1934). A more traditional AI statement of this problem is
that an agent can have as goals in its plan, logical formulae whose predicates describe actions that collectives engage
in and whose agent argument is such a collective (Hobbs, 1990).
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this does not entail the presence of a desire to cooperate.
Rao et al. (1992) adopt this approach, augmenting the notions of individual intentions, beliefs
and desires with structures describing joint goals and joint intentions. Their basic unit of activity
is the plan expression, a pair consisting of a plan type (an abstract structure that, when executed
by an agent, results in the occurrence of an action in the real world) and an agent. Complex
actions involving goal interdependencies are obtained by combining plan expressions with
operators from dynamic logic (eg sequence, parallelism and non-deterministic choice (Harel,
1984)). In addition to describing the activities of individuals it is also possible to seamlessly
define social actions, as the “agent” in a plan expression can correspond to a team. This enables
joint goals and joint commitments to be represented in a simple and elegant manner. A joint goal
G is defined as meaning that all members of the group have the same goal G and that they all
mutually believe that G is held as a joint goal. Joint intentions are defined in the same way.
Following from these definitions, they prove a theorem which states that: if a group of agents
jointly intends a particular action, they all have it as a joint goal and also mutually believe it.
Kinny et al. (1992) have adapted and extended this formalism to allow joint plans to be expressed
at a team level and have also shown how these plans can be used to guide the activities of the
individual agents.
This formalism adequately represents the notion of commitment to joint activity and the
theorem relating joint intentions and joint goals captures, in a formal framework, the inherent
notion of cooperation present in collaborative actions. By defining joint intentions independently
of considerations about monitoring commitments, the formalism offers an opportunity to
represent social systems which have different types of conventions. However despite recognising
that actions may fail, and hence commitments may be reneged upon, the formulation does not
embody any form of convention which describes how to react in such circumstances. Also by
opting for dynamic logic to combine plan operators, the expressiveness of the planning language
is limited. A general purpose goal interdependence operator would remove this shortcoming.
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The model of Joint Responsibility (Jennings, 1992) also describes joint action in terms of
teams of agents. This model extends Cohen and Levesque’s work on joint persistent goals (see
2.2.1) and stipulates that agents should make joint commitments to agreed sequences of actions as
well as to the shared objective itself. Commitment to the common solution provides a context for
the performance of actions in much the same way as the shared aim guides the objectives of the
individuals. The convention for joint persistent goals defines how to monitor commitments to the
common objective and an additional convention specifies that the common plan should be re-
examined if any of the following conditions arise: the agreed plan will not achieve the desired
results, the agreed plan cannot be executed or the agreed plan has not been executed properly. The
model has been implemented in a general purpose cooperation framework and applied to the real-
world problem of electricity transportation management where it led to high degrees of
coordination even in the most unpredictable and dynamic situations (Jennings and Mamdani,
1992).
2.2.3 Computational Models
At present there is a relatively large gap between the theoretical models of commitments and
conventions which were described in the previous two sub-sections and implemented DAI
systems. This chasm exists partly because of the differing motivations of model and system
builders, but also reflects some major theoretical shortcomings. For example most of the
theoretical models embody the notion of mutual belief, however it has been shown that this is
unattainable in systems in which communication is not guaranteed or when there is some
uncertainty in message delivery time (Halpern and Moses, 1984).
Bratman et al. (1988) have devised a Belief-Desire-Intention architecture in which
commitments play a central role in guiding an agent’s actions and future planning and in which an
“override mechanism” provides a computational realisation of conventions. This proposal is
predominantly for an individual agent situated in an asocial context, but it provides a useful
functional architecture which can be augmented for use in a cooperative context. Burmeister and
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Sundermeyer (1992) specify and implement an architecture based on individual intentions which
takes into account the fact that agents are situated in multi-agent environments. Their
representation of intention, although not based on a particular theoretical model, does include the
resources required by a commitment in its definition. Jennings (1993) specifies and implements an
architecture based on the model of joint responsibility in which agents can make both individual
and joint commitments. Agents also have an explicit social convention which specifies under
what circumstances commitments can be reneged upon and how to act towards others in such
cases.
As well as providing the basis for agent architectures, commitments have also been used as
key components of DAI programming languages. Shoham (1993) uses commitments in his work
on specifying a computational framework for agent programming. Agent-Oriented Programming
is a specialisation of object oriented programming in which the mental state of an agent (object)
consists of the precisely defined components: beliefs, commitments and capabilities.
Commitment is a primitive feature of the programming language and has the form that at a
particular time t, agent A is committed to agent B about G where G can be a belief or an action. In
this formalism, commitment is viewed as an inherently social phenomena with commitments
made to the self being a special case (agents A and B being the same entity)7.
Bond (1989) also outlines a language for social problem solvers in which agents are
programmed in terms of their commitments to one another. Agents are described in terms of: the
actions they will perform and the resources they will need; the beliefs they hold; their
expectations about the actions of others and the resources they will supply and, finally, the
resources they will supply to others by fulfilling their obligations. Commitment is represented as a
logical literal which can be a goal, belief or action and which has an associated specification of
the resources it will utilise.
7. Fikes (1982) also uses the notion of making commitments to others as the basis of his framework for describing
cooperative work in informal domains (such as an office).
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In both languages commitments are primitive concepts and there is no confusion with notions
of reneging upon obligations. Conventions can be specified separately using other primitives of
the agent language and by detailing various properties for the persistence of commitments over
time. However it is doubtful whether joint commitments could be encoded in either language as it
stands at present - they would need to be defined as a new language primitive.
3 The Commitment and Convention Model of Coordination
This section describes a new unifying model of coordination which has the concepts of (joint)
commitments and (social) conventions at its core. This model distills, synthesizes and clarifies
many of the important features of the extant models of coordination presented in the previous
section. Using a distributed goal search characterisation of DAI (section 3.1), the “Centrality of
Commitments and Conventions Hypothesis” is explained and argued for:
Centrality of Commitments & Conventions Hypothesis
All coordination mechanisms can ultimately be reduced to (joint) commitments and
their associated (social) conventions.
3.1 Distributed AI as Distributed Goal Search
Several authors have recently characterised DAI as a form of distributed goal search with multiple
loci of control (Durfee and Montgomery, 1991; Gasser, 1992b; Lesser, 1991). Adopting Lesser’s
basic formalism, the actions of Agent1 and Agent2 in respectively solving goals G
1
0 and G
2
0 can
be expressed as a classical AND/OR goal structure search8 (figure 2). The classical structure has
been augmented to include the representation of interdependencies between goals because these
are the key to coordination in DAI systems. The resources needed to solve primitive goals (leaf
8. Figure 2 represents a situation in which each individual has its own goals, but to achieve them it must interact with
others. To represent a DAI system in which all community members pursue a common goal, there would be a single
root node corresponding to the shared objective.
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nodes) are also shown. Interdependencies can exist between high level sibling goals, such as G11
and G12, or they can be more distant in the goal structure (eg between G
1
1,1 and G
2
p,2). In the
latter case, G11 and G
2
p become interacting goals if G
1
1,1 is used to solve G
1
1. Indirect
dependencies exist between goals through shared resources (eg G1m,1,2 and G
2
p,2,2 through
resource d1j). Resource dependencies can be removed simply by providing more of the resource
in question; dependencies between goals, on the otherhand, cannot be circumvented as they are a
logical consequence of the community’s environment. In all other aspects the two types of
dependence are the same.
Interdependencies can be classified along two orthogonal dimensions: whether they are weak
or strong and whether they are uni-directional or bi-directional. Strong dependencies must be
G2p,1,3 (G
2
p,1,4) G
2
p,2,2
G20
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Figure 2: A distributed goal search tree involving Agent1 and Agent2. The dotted arrows indicate
interdependencies between goals and data in different agents, solid arrows dependencies within an agent.
The superscripts associated with goals and data indicate the agent which contains them.
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satisfied if the dependent goal is to succeed, weak dependencies facilitate problem solving but
need not be fulfilled for the dependent goal to complete. An example of a strong dependency is
where the output of a goal (G) is a mandatory input (I) for the dependent goal (DG) and that G is
the only source of I in the community; a weak dependency would exist if there was more than one
source for I or if I was an optional input for DG. A uni-directional dependency (written G11,1 --->
G2p,2) means that agent2’s goal Gp,2 is dependent (either strongly or weakly) on agent1’s goal
G1,1, but G
1
1,1 is unaffected by G
2
p,2,; with bi-directional dependencies (written G
1
m,1 <--->
G2m,2) the goals of both agents are affected. The providing of information I by goal G for goal
DG, above, is an example of a uni-directional dependence (G ---> DG); a bi-directional
dependence occurs, for example, when two actions need to be performed simultaneously.
For this work it was necessary to extend Lesser’s graph formalism to allow joint goals (eg
G1,2m). Joint goals represent inherently social actions or objectives which a group of agents have
decided to solve as a team. They provide the glue to bind individuals’ actions into a cohesive
whole and must ultimately give rise to individual goals as only individual agents have the ability
to act (perform leaf node tasks). Joint goals can be in the mind of each individual who is acting as
part of the collective, implying that everything necessary for team behaviour can be possessed by
individual agents even though the aim makes reference to the collective. Thus the joint goal G1,2m
is internalised within Agent1 and Agent2 and results in Agent1 performing G
1
m,1 and Agent2
performing G2m,2. Such joint action requires a shared objective which the group wishes to
achieve and a recognition that they want to achieve it in a collaborative manner. So in a
collaborative lift, for example, all team members must want to lift the object and they must want
to do so as part of a group effort. The second component of the definition is important because it
distinguishes between identical and parallel goals (Conte et al., 1990). For instance if both x and y
have the goal to cook spaghetti then their goals are identical; but if both agents have the goal to
eat spaghetti (i.e. x has the goal that x eats spaghetti and y has the goal that y eats spaghetti) they
merely have parallel goals. These two goal types result in different forms of social action -
identical goals can give rise to joint goals if the two agents decide to work as a team, whereas
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parallel goals give rise to competition and will certainly not result in joint action.
Lesser (1991) makes the following general observations about the graph formalism. The
entire goal structure need not be fully elaborated in order for problem solving to begin, it may be
constructed as problem solving progresses. Actually developing the graph can be a complex
social activity involving negotiation, persuasion and the resolution of conflicts or it may be
undertaken centrally by one agent. Construction can involve a top-down elaboration based on the
higher-level goals, a bottom up process driven by the data, or a mixture of the two. Finally, the
formalism says nothing about whether the structure is statically defined or dynamically evolves
from a composite view of the current, local goal structures of the individual agents.
3.2 Coordination as Control over Distributed Goal Search
Formulating a DAI system as a distributed goal search problem allows the activities which may
require social interaction to be clearly identified, these include: (i) defining the goal graph
(including identification and classification of interdependencies); (ii) assigning particular regions
of the graph to appropriate agents; (iii) controlling decisions about which areas of the graph to
explore; (iv) executing (traversing) the goal structure; (v) ensuring that successful traversal of the
search space is reported. Some of these activities may be done in a collaborative fashion and some
may be done by one individual. Determining which approach is adopted for each of the various
phases is a matter of system design. It will depend upon the nature of the domain (eg in
applications in which agents have distinct expertise, assignment of goals simply becomes a matter
of identifying the individual capable of performing the activity), the type of agents which are
included in the community (eg with autonomous agents, the global search space is given by the
union of the local search spaces and each agent works on its own local goals) and the desired
solution characteristics (eg to increase the likelihood of an important result being produced, the
same area of the search space may be redundantly assigned to multiple agents, whereas if the
desire is to optimise agent usage then such an arrangement is inefficient).
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Here consideration of the coordination process is restricted to deciding which areas of the
graph to explore, actually executing the goal structure and ensuring successful traversal of the
goal graph is reported. Assuming there are interdependencies between the goals, or amongst the
resource requirements, of the different agents, coordination is desirable (sometimes essential) if
the community is to act in a coherent manner.
The nature of this dependency is the critical determinant of the type of coordination. For
example if Agent1 knows that G
2
p,2,2 requires resource d
1
j before it can start (strong dependency,
uni-directional), then it may decide to execute G1m,1,2 (to produce the necessary resource) before
G1m,1,1 if there is no other information distinguishing between these two alternatives. Secondly
the relationship between G1m,1 and G
2
m,2 may stipulate that both actions need to be performed
simultaneously (strong dependency, bi-directional) in which case the two agents need to reach an
agreement about the respective execution times9. Finally, if Agent1 chose G
1
1,1 as a means of
satisfying G11 the result of this task may provide valuable information (weak dependency, uni-
directional) which Agent2 could use when solving G
2
p,2 (eg it may provide a partial result which
enables G2p,2 to be significantly shorter). Knowing this, Agent2 may start with G
2
p,1.
3.3 Commitments
The following points represent the important intuitions present in the extant models of
coordination. The term “commitment” means a pledge or promise. Agents can make pledges both
about actions and beliefs and these pledges can either be about the future or the past. Thus agent A
can commit itself to play cricket tomorrow (object of commitment = action, time = future) and
agent B can commit itself to believe a particular version of events about the reasons for the start of
World War I (object of commitment = belief, time = past). For the purposes of coordination,
however, the most important commitments are related to future actions. No fundamental
9. Other types of temporal relationship, such as BEFORE, DURING and OVERLAPS (Allen, 1984), can also be
modelled in this manner.
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difference between pledges which are internalised within an agent (eg I will lose 12 pounds in
weight) and those which are made to a second party (eg I will fix your car for you) are assumed.
Commitments may be conditional - for example A will play cricket tomorrow if the weather is
sunny. Finally, pledging to undertake an activity involves an associated commitment about the
resources required to carry out that action. So if A pledges to play cricket tomorrow, then it is also
devoting its resources of time and energy to this activity.
If an agent commits itself to perform a particular action then, provided that its circumstances
do not change, it will endeavour to honour that pledge. This obligation constrains an agent’s
subsequent decisions about undertaking fresh activities since it knows that sufficient resources
must be reserved to honour existing commitments. If an agent had infinite resources which could
be freely allocated to any permutation of its commitments then there would be no such restriction.
However as most resources are finite, and also because there are often constraints imposed by the
environment, an agent is limited in the number and type of commitments it can make10. For this
reason, an agent’s commitments should, as far as it is aware, be both internally consistent and
consistent with its beliefs (Bratman, 1990). The former means that an individual’s commitments
should not conflict with one another - for example an agent should not pledge to simultaneously
perform two goals which both require the same non-shareable resource. The latter means that if an
agent’s intended actions are executed in a world in which its beliefs are true, the desired state of
affairs will ensue. This accounts for the fact that an agent’s beliefs will, in most cases, be both
partial and imprecise - meaning commitments may be made on false premises and therefore turn
out to be unachievable or inappropriate.
Joint commitments have all the aforementioned properties of individual commitments, but
have the additional constraint that they involve more than one agent11. This means the overall
10. Commitments provide a “filter of admissability” (Bratman, 1984), agents should not commit themselves to
something which will conflict with or endanger their existing commitments without good cause.
11. A joint commitment involving one agent is equivalent to an individual commitment.
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state of the joint commitment is distributed; with individual commitments the agent which has
made the pledge is aware of its status since it forms part of its mental state. So, for example, the
state of joint commitment G1,2m is distributed between Agent1 in its processing of G
1
m,1 and
Agent2 through its processing of G
2
m,2. Ideally all team members should have access to a shared
mental state related to the joint commitment as this would ensure they all simultaneously have the
same experiences and beliefs and also that there can be no divergence amongst the group’s
members. However since group activity is undertaken by individuals and not the team en mass, it
is the individuals who have first exposure to events related to the joint commitment. Thus a shared
mental state is impossible unless all the agents possess a single common structure which records
all of their beliefs about the joint commitment (i.e. agents cannot have any local or private beliefs
about the joint action). For example in a team search, if one agent satisfies the group’s objective
and finds the target item then at that precise instant in time it is the only one who knows that the
joint commitment has been fulfilled. This agent may subsequently inform the others of its
achievements, meaning they all share a common perspective once more, however in the meantime
different members of the group have diverged in their beliefs about the joint commitment. In all
other respects, the difference between the two types of commitment is merely quantitative (eg a
joint commitment is, in general, likely to contain more interdependent goals, but the types of
relationships will be identical to those which can be found between individual commitments).
3.4 Conventions
An agent should honour its commitments provided that its circumstances do not change. However
in most realistic scenarios, agents are situated in time-varying contexts - the external world may
change, the agent may become aware of new information, another agent may attempt to interact
with it, and so on. Therefore in many cases an agent’s beliefs will alter between the making of a
commitment and it actually performing the associated processing - in fact, the longer the time
between these two events the greater the likelihood of a change occurring. In some instances,
these changes will leave the agent’s commitment unaffected, however in other cases commitments
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may need to be reviewed. For example if agent A is informed that the first customer at a new
garage opening tomorrow will receive a Ferrari then it may indeed revise its commitments about
playing cricket. Commitments should, therefore, be relatively stable over time (otherwise there is
little point in making them), but they should not be irrevocable.
To operate successfully and intelligently, agents need general policies for governing the
reconsideration of their commitments. These conventions describe circumstances under which an
agent should reconsider its commitments and indicate the appropriate course of action to either
retain, rectify or abandon the commitment. When specifying conventions a balance needs to be
reached between constantly reconsidering all commitments (which will enable the agent to
respond rapidly to changing circumstances, but means it will spend a significant percentage of its
time reasoning about action rather than actually carrying out useful tasks) and never reconsidering
commitments (which means agents spend most of their time acting, but what they are actually
doing many not be particularly relevant in the light of subsequent changes). Kinny and Georgeff
(1991) carried out a series of experiments in which different conventions were examined in
environments which exhibited different rates of change. In all cases it was found that the “bold”
agents (those which never reconsidered their plans) performed better than the “normal” agents
(those which are slightly more open to reconsideration) which were better than the “cautious”
agents (those which were prone to reconsideration). However in rapidly changing and uncertain
environments the utility of a relatively sophisticated convention is significantly increased. Indeed
empirical evaluation has shown that in such circumstances conventions play a pivotal role in
ensuring the community acts in a coherent manner (Jennings and Mamdani, 1992).
Both the list of situations under which commitments should be reassessed and the actions
which should be taken in such circumstances can be empty. So an agent could remain
permanently committed to a goal even if it has been achieved and an agent could take no actions
as a result of changes in its circumstances. The action part is particularly useful in multiple agent
environments because it specifies how any interdependencies with other commitments should be
30
dealt with (see R2, R3 and R4 in figure 3), although it may also be used for dealing with purely
internal matters related to the dropping of commitments (see figure 1). Figure 3 gives an example
convention in which the reasons for reassessment are based on Cohen and Levesque’s formalism
(see section 2.1) and the actions are designed for operating in a multi-agent community in which
the communication bandwidth is limited.
An agent may have several conventions at its disposal. Although there is no intrinsic
difference between a convention for purely local goals (see figure 1) and one which has external
dependencies (as in figure 3), the overall coherence of the community will be improved if some
minimum reporting actions are included (Jennings and Mamdani, 1992). Therefore an agent may
have some conventions for dealing with purely local commitments, some for dealing with
commitments which are weakly related to others and some for handling strong dependencies. An
agent must have precisely one convention for each of its active commitments, although it may use
different conventions for different commitments.
CONVENTION: Limited-Bandwidth
REASONS FOR RE-ASSESSING COMMITMENT:
• COMMITMENT SATISFIED
• COMMITMENT UNATTAINABLE
• MOTIVATION FOR COMMITMENT NO LONGER PRESENT
ACTIONS:
R1: IF COMMITMENT SATISFIED OR
COMMITMENT UNATTAINABLE OR
MOTIVATION FOR COMMITMENT NO LONGER PRESENT
THEN DROP COMMITMENT
R2: IF COMMITMENT SATISFIED
THEN INFORM ALL RELATED COMMITMENTS
R3: IF COMMITMENT DROPPED BECAUSE UNATTAINABLE OR MOTIVATION NOT PRESENT
THEN INFORM ALL STRONGLY RELATED COMMITMENTS
R4: IF COMMITMENT DROPPED BECAUSE UNATTAINABLE OR MOTIVATION NOT PRESENT
AND COMMUNICATION RESOURCES NOT OVERBURDENED
THEN INFORM ALL WEAKLY RELATED COMMITMENTS
Figure 3: Sample Convention
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For inter-agent dependencies, the participants should, ideally, be mutually aware of the
convention which governs their interaction. Such awareness is needed if the agents are to
minimise the uncertainty in their collaboration and maximise the benefit of the coordination
process. Thus, for example, if Agent2 must have resource d
1
j to perform G
2
p,2,2 then it will ask
Agent1 to make this resource available. However merely asking for d
1
j to be produced is not
sufficient, because Agent2 also wants to be informed when it is available. To ensure the necessary
dissemination occurs, Agent2 must also request that the resource is produced using an appropriate
convention (eg the Limited-Bandwidth convention of figure 3). Whether Agent1 accepts this
convention proposal will depend on its preferences and the relative authority relationship of the
two agents. If the proposal is acceptable, or Agent2 can force Agent1 to use it, then the convention
will be adopted. If the proposal is unacceptable, then the two agents will have to enter a
negotiation phase to decide upon an acceptable solution. Alternatively, rather than having to
determine the convention for each and every interdependent goal at runtime, which will
significantly slow down processing, the system designer may stipulate that when two agents
interact they will always use a particular convention. He may even specify that the whole
community must use a particular convention for all their interactions.
Although agents engaged in a joint commitment cannot have a shared mental state, it is
important that relevant information pertaining to their commitment is disseminated at the earliest
possible opportunity. However agents should not broadcast information about their commitments
every time they change as this will overburden the communication resources and needlessly
distract the recipients. Rather they should only inform those agents who are likely to be affected
by their change. Such interchange aims to provide an approximation to a common state and tries
to minimise the effects of distribution whilst not overburdening the communication channels. The
two fundamental pieces of information which must be shared are: (i) the status of the commitment
to the shared objective; (ii) the status of the commitment to the given team framework12. If an
agent’s beliefs about either of these key issues changes, then it is part of the “cooperativeness”
inherent in joint goals that all team members are informed. Many joint actions depend upon the
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participation of all their team members, therefore a change of commitment from one participant
can jeopardise the whole group’s efforts. Hence if an agent comes to believe that a fellow team
member is no longer jointly committed, it also needs to reassess its position with respect to the
shared objective. These basic assumptions are encoded in a convention which represents the
minimum state of affairs for joint commitments (figure 4) - this convention is similar to the
persistence of a weak achievement goal in Cohen and Levesque’s formalism for joint goals (see
section 2.2.1). Thus whereas any conventions can be used for individual commitments, including
the empty one, joint commitments require each team member to adhere to the minimum social
convention. This requirement is the sole distinguishing characteristic between individual agents
which have highly interrelated commitments and a team of agents which have a joint
commitment.
In certain applications it may be desirable to have more sophisticated social conventions
12. The second stipulation covers the situation in which an agent, which is initially jointly committed to a
collaborative act, decides to leave the team but continues to pursue the shared objective in an individualistic manner.
In this case the agent can no longer be said to be jointly committed, since it will follow its own solution path without
consideration of its affects on the others who remain in the original team.
BASIC SOCIAL CONVENTION
REASONS FOR RE-ASSESSING COMMITMENT:
• STATUS OF COMMITMENT TO SHARED OBJECTIVE CHANGES
• STATUS OF COMMITMENT TO REACHING SHARED OBJECTIVE IN
PRESENT TEAM CONTEXT CHANGES
• STATUS OF JOINT COMMITMENT OF A TEAM MEMBER CHANGES
ACTIONS:
R1: IF STATUS OF COMMITMENT TO SHARED OBJECTIVE CHANGES OR
STATUS OF COMMITEMENT TO PRESENT TEAM CONTEXT CHANGES
THEN INFORM ALL OTHER TEAM MEMBERS OF CHANGE
R2: IF STATUS OF JOINT COMMITMENT OF A TEAM MEMBER CHANGES
THEN DETERMINE WHETHER JOINT COMMITMENT STILL VIABLE
Figure 4: Minimum Convention for Joint Commitments
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which build upon the basic one. For example when agents are situated in environments in which
they possess neither complete nor correct beliefs about their world or other agents, have
changeable goals and fallible actions and are subject to interruption from external events,
reconsideration of commitments and decisions about subsequent actions becomes a primary
consideration. In these complex and dynamic environments it is difficult to ensure that a group’s
behaviour remains coordinated, because initial assumptions and subsequent deductions may be
JOINT RESPONSIBILITY SOCIAL CONVENTION
INHERIT: BASIC SOCIAL CONVENTION
REASONS FOR RE-ASSESSING COMMITMENT:
• SHARED OBJECTIVE IS MET
• SHARED OBJECTIVE WILL NEVER BE MET
• MOTIVATION FOR SHARED OBJECTIVE IS NO LONGER PRESENT
• AGREED PLAN WILL NOT ACHIEVE DESIRED RESULTS
• AGREED PLAN CANNOT BE EXECUTED
• AGREED PLAN HAS NOT BEEN EXECUTED PROPERLY
ACTIONS:
R1: IF SHARED OBJECTIVE IS MET OR
SHARED OBJECTIVE WILL NEVER BE MET OR
MOTIVATION FOR SHARED OBJECTIVE IS NO LONGER PRESENT
THEN DROP JOINT COMMITMENT TO SHARED OBJECTIVE & TO AGREED PLAN
R2: IF AGREED PLAN WILL NOT ACHIEVE DESIRED RESULTS OR
AGREED PLAN CANNOT BE EXECUTED OR
AGREED PLAN HAS NOT BEEN EXECUTED PROPERLY
THEN DROP JOINT COMMITMENT TO AGREED PLAN
R3: IF DROP JOINT COMMITMENT TO AGREED PLAN AND
CAN RE-PLAN USING SAME AGENTS
THEN DEVELOP AND JOINTLY COMMIT TO NEW PLAN
R4: IF DROP JOINT COMMITMENT TO AGREED PLAN AND
CANNOT RE-PLAN USING SAME AGENTS AND
CAN DEVELOP NEW PLAN USING DIFFERENT TEAM
THEN DROP JOINT COMMITMENT TO EXISTING TEAM & JOINTLY COMMIT TO
NEW TEAM
R5: IF CANNOT DEVELOP NEW COMMON PLAN
THEN DROP JOINT COMMITMENT TO SHARED OBJECTIVE & TO AGREED PLAN
Figure 5: Joint Responsibility Convention for Joint Commitments
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incorrect or inappropriate. Joint responsibility (section 2.2.2) is an example of a coordination
model whose convention was designed to operate in just such situations (figure 5).
3.5 Commitments, Conventions and Coordination
With respect to coordinating the behaviour of multiple agents, the most important feature of
commitments is that they enable individuals to make assumptions about the actions of other
community members. They provide a degree of predictability to counteract the uncertainty caused
by the distribution of control. So for the joint goal G1,2m, Agent2 can carry out G
2
m,2 in the
knowledge that Agent1 is probably performing G
1
m,1 and that if it is not, then it will at least be
trying to inform it of this change (because of the basic social convention). Without this assurance
there would be no point in Agent2 even starting G
2
m,2 since it is only carrying out this activity to
achieve the joint goal and the joint goal requires both sub-goals to be fulfilled. Thus each agent is
only carrying out its action because it believes that the other is also doing its bit. Commitments
also enable agents to reason about the activities of others in deciding how to adapt their local
problem solving behaviour to benefit from social interactions. For example if Agent2 knew that
Agent1 was committed to G
1
1,1, whose outcome enables it to improve its solution of G
2
p,2, then it
may decide to wait for this information and process G2p,1 in the meantime.
Commitments can be made at many different levels and have correspondingly varied time
horizons. When Agent1 commits itself to perform G
1
0 this will invariably be a high level
objective (eg diagnose faults in an electricity network) to which the agent will probably remain
committed for some considerable amount of time. The leaf nodes, on the otherhand, will involve
fairly specific courses of action (eg see if there is a fault in low voltage line1) and have a much
shorter duration.
Generally the greater the degree of accuracy to which an agent knows its acquaintances
commitments, the more detailed its predictions can be and so the more coherently the community
will behave. However it is not always desirable to transmit all of the low-level details about
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commitments - rather agents should communicate at a sufficiently detailed level to promote
satisfactory coordination, but at a sufficiently abstract level to ensure agents retain sufficient
flexibility in achieving their objectives in an uncertain environment. For example knowing that
Agent2 is committed to G
2
0, gives no indication whether G
2
p,1 will be performed. However
knowing that Agent2 is committed to G
2
p means that it is possible to predict that G
2
p,1 will indeed
be performed and that Agent1 could delay its processing of G
1
1,2 to benefit from the weak, uni-
directional dependence. If Agent2 communicated a more detailed description of its intentions, eg
that it will perform G2p,1,3, then this information is of no additional benefit to Agent1 since it is
not dependent on how G2p,1 is achieved. Not sending details of how G
2
p,1 will be achieved also
leaves Agent2 unconstrained as to whether it will use G
2
p,1,3 or G
2
p,1,4.
3.5.1 Commitments involving Goals and Sub-Goals
If there is an AND relationship being undertaken by a cooperating group, then all commitments to
the sub-goals must be honoured if the parent goal is to succeed. If just one agent reneges, then the
other agents’ activities are doomed in their present form. Therefore it is only the belief that others
will honour their commitments, which makes it rational for an agent to carry out its part. Without
this confidence no agent would carry out its individual processing, since achievement of the sub-
goals in isolation is unlikely to bring it any benefits. Hence AND goals cannot be achieved by
cooperative problem solving without the notion of commitment.
If a goal has a number of sub-goals, organised in an OR relationship, which are each assigned
to different agents who all carry out their activities in parallel, then failure of one agent to fulfill
its commitment will not jeopardise achievement of the parent goal. However if all the agents
renege upon their obligations then the parent goal will not be achieved; thus the commitment of at
least one agent must be guaranteed. If agents coordinate their activities more closely and arrange
for only one of the alternate sub-goals to be carried out at any one time (to avoid needless
duplication) then commitment failure can have serious consequences for the community’s overall
level of coherence. For example if a team agrees that Agent1 will carry out the subgoal which
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fulfills the parent goal G, then the remaining agents can continue with their processing and can
make subsequent commitments based on the fact that G will be achieved and that they do not have
to expend resources towards this end. However if Agent1 does not fulfill its pledge, then provided
that G is still desired, one of the other agents will have to carry out some unexpected processing
activity. This additional work may conflict with commitments which the agent has subsequently
made and may result in it having to delay or even abandon some of them because additional
resources are unexpectedly required to achieve G. Such delays may then have a knock-on effect to
other agents, causing the community to operate ineffectively and requiring it to undertake a
significant amount of replanning.
3.5.2 Commitments involving Dependencies between Goals
Consider the situation in which Agent1 and Agent2 have the respective interrelated goals G
1
1 and
G21. If there is a strong bi-directional dependence then both agents must honour their
commitments otherwise neither of them will be able to achieve their objectives. If the relation is
strong but uni-directional (G11 ---> G
2
1), then failure of Agent1 to honour its commitment means
that Agent2 will be unable to achieve G
2
1 and it will either have to find an alternative path for
achieving the parent goal or abandon it completely.
With weak dependencies the agents involved may still be able to proceed but possibly in a
suboptimal manner. For example an agent may have delayed processing an action on the premise
that an acquaintance will provide it with sufficient information to significantly speed up its
problem solving. If this information is no longer forthcoming, because the acquaintance changed
its commitments, then the agent has wasted potentially useful processing time. As another
example, an agent may select a certain path in the belief that information which will be provided
through a weak dependency will make this path less expensive than its alternatives. But if the
agent providing the information reneges upon its commitment and the information is not
forthcoming then the chosen path may be suboptimal.
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If the relationship is bi-directional and one agent fails to fulfill its pledge, the agent which is
still committed to its side of the bargain may be adversely affected since it chose to undertake the
goal believing that it would be able to profit from the commitment of the other agent. In the uni-
directional case (G11 ---> G
2
1) if Agent1 changes its mind, Agent2’s processing of G
2
1 will be
adversely affected for the reason described above.
In both the weak and the strong uni-directional cases, if Agent2 drops its commitment to G
2
1
then this may even have a detrimental affect on Agent1. This is the case if Agent1 chose G
1
1, even
though it was locally suboptimal, because the net utility to the community of the performance of
the pair {G11, G
2
1} whilst satisfying the specified relationship was higher than if Agent1 chose an
alternative to G11 and Agent2 chose G
2
1. However the potential benefits of Agent1’s sacrifice
were not observed because Agent2 failed to carry out its pledge about G
2
1.
3.5.3 Conventions and Goal Interrelationships
Conventions which report changes in commitments to dependent agents are especially important
when there is an AND relationship between a goal and its constituent sub-goals. Without adequate
information dissemination, the other agents will remain committed to performing their sub-goals
which will not satisfy their original purpose of fulfilling the parent goal. This is also the case for
OR relationships in which only one of the sub-goals is active at any one time.
In terms of interagent dependencies (G11 --> G
2
1), reports of changes in the status of
commitments are essential if the relationship is strong and bi-directional and if Agent1 reneges on
its goal and the relation is strong and uni-directional. In all other cases reports on changes of
commitments are desirable in that they may enable the agent which is still committed to reassess
its position. This may result in it choosing a different path through the graph - either because it is
freed from the constraint of having to honour the relationship or because it can no longer benefit
from the interaction with the agent which is no longer committed.
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4 Coordination without Commitments and Conventions?
In addition to the models of section two, a number of other approaches to coordination have been
developed which do not contain explicit references to either commitments or conventions. Three
such mechanisms which are common in DAI are: organisational structuring, exchanging meta-
level information and multi-agent planning. Each of these approaches is examined in turn; there is
a brief statement about how it facilitates the coordination of behaviour, what its main
characteristics are and how it can be reformulated into the Centrality of Commitments and
Conventions Hypothesis. Choosing between coordination mechanisms for a particular application
is a matter of system design - there is no universally best approach. Indeed several multi-agent
systems embody more than one approach because of the differing time horizons, level of detail
and communication requirements (eg Durfee and Montgomery’s (1991) work on coordination in a
hierarchical behaviour space).
4.1 Organisational Structures
In the context of multi-agent systems, an organisational structure can be viewed as a pattern of
information and control relationships which exist between individuals within the community.
Control relationships can be hierarchical, heterarchical or flat and are responsible for designating
the relative authority of the agents and for shaping the types of social interaction which can occur.
Organisational structure can also be used as a high-level specification of the distribution of
problem solving capabilities amongst community members (Durfee et al., 1989). For example
when building a community of agents for diagnosing faults in an electricity network (Aarnts et
al., 1991; Cockburn et al., 1992), the system designer may specify a functional organisation
(agent1 works on high voltage faults, while agent2 works at the low voltage level) or a spatial
organisation (agent1 deals with all types of faults in region1, agent2 with all types of faults in
region2). In a spatial distribution in which there are overlaps, authority relationships determine
how redundances are avoided - in a hierarchy, high level nodes inform the lower level ones of the
activities they are to pursue, whereas in a flat structure this process will only be achievable
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through direct negotiation between the parties concerned.
Organisational structures give general, long term information about the relationships between
agents. When viewed as a distribution of capabilities they specify which actions an individual will
undertake and provide a means of dividing up the search space without having to go into detail
about the particular sub-trees. Other authors have followed this basic approach using different
terminology. Singh (1990) employs the notion of strategies to provide an abstract specification of
the behaviour of an agent or a group and Werner uses roles for describing expectations about
individual behaviour (see section 2.1). Shoham and Tennenholtz (1992) propose a more detailed
organisational form which they term a “social law”. In this approach the society adopts a set of
laws (eg road traffic rules) which specify how individuals should behave. Each programmer is
then committed to obeying these laws when building his individual agent and can assume that all
the others will as well.
Organisational structures aid the process of coordination by providing a high-level view of
how the community solves its problems and also by identifying the role of each individual. For
example the Distributed Vehicle Monitoring Testbed (Lesser and Corkill, 1983) simulates a
spatially organised community of agents which performs a distributed interpretation to track
vehicles moving amongst them. Each agent decides which areas of the search space to explore
based upon its current local view, but uses organisational knowledge about its problem solving
role in the community and the roles of others to guide its decisions so that it is a more effective
participant in the community. With this approach coordination consists of two concurrent
activities: the construction and maintenance of a community wide organisational structure and the
continuous elaboration of this structure into precise activities using the local knowledge and
control capabilities of each agent. In this context the organisation is specified as a set of “interest
areas” and as a set of ratings of priority. The former indicate what, when and to whom information
should be sent, the latter indicate how to evaluate the importance of processing different types of
goals. Authority relationships indicate the relative priorities which should be attached to
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processing externally generated goals versus local goals.
When an agent undertakes a particular role within an organisation it is, in fact, making a high-
level commitment about the types of activity it will pursue. For instance in the electricity
management scenario, if agent1 undertakes the role of diagnosing high-voltage faults, other
agents will expect it to undertake work in this area. They will make subsequent decisions in their
local problem solving based on the assumption that agent1 will indeed be dealing with all the
faults on the high voltage network.
Although they are relatively long-term structures, it has been shown that different
organisations are appropriate for different problem situations and performance requirements
(Malone, 1987). Hence as a situation evolves, the community may need to periodically reassess its
structure to determine whether it is still appropriate or whether a rearrangement would be
beneficial - see the work of Ishida et al. (1990) for an illustration of the dynamic reorganisation of
a group of cooperating agents in response to changes in the environment. In the electricity
management scenario, for example, the community may decide that it is best to replace the agent
carrying out high-voltage diagnosis with several spatially distributed agents so that the load and
the reliance upon any one individual is reduced. This evaluation corresponds to a convention for
the organisational structure.
4.2 Meta-Level Information Exchange
Meta-level information is control level information about the current priorities and focus of a
problem solver (Gasser, 1992b) - it indicates approximate regions of the search space on which
agents will concentrate most of their efforts. For example in the functionally distributed electricity
management scenario described in section 4.1, agent1 may indicate that it believes the most
important fault is in region1. Upon receiving this information agent2, who is working on the high-
voltage network, may also decide to concentrate its efforts on this region to determine whether the
fault being experienced on the low voltage network is in fact a manifestation of a problem with
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the high voltage system (eg no supply is getting through).
Durfee (1988) has developed a meta-level information exchange approach to coordination
called Partial Global Planning in which agents build and share local plans as a means of
identifying potential improvements to coordination13. These partial global plans (PGPs) are
exchanged by agents as a means of building representations of their acquaintances’ activities -
they indicate which goals will be pursued, in what order, what results will be achieved and how
long each goal is likely to take. Individual community members then use a model of themselves
and a representation of their acquaintances to identify when agents have PGPs whose objectives
are part of some larger community effort. If such complimentary activities are detected the related
PGPs are combined into a single, larger PGP which provides a more complete view of the group’s
activity. Agents can then revise their PGPs to reflect the new position and may consequently
decide to alter their local plans to better utilise the community’s resources. For example a PGP
could indicate that a partial solution to be formed by one agent provides useful predictive
information for an acquaintance. This expectation and the transmission of the partial solution
would then be explicitly represented in the PGP, resulting in a plan to use information resources
more effectively. As a second example, an agent may survey its current view of community-wide
PGPs and identify acquaintances who are being under utilised, whilst there are others who are
overburdened. By modifying its PGPs, the agent could propose how the community could transfer
subproblems so as to work better as a team.
Meta-level information exchange is a medium term source of knowledge about an agent’s
commitments - shorter than organisation structures but longer than multi-agent planning
approaches. It enhances coordination only to the degree to which it is accurate - indeed inaccurate
information may be more detrimental than no information at all. Again it can be seen that once an
13. This approach differs from standard multi-agent planning (section 4.3) in that agents might never reach mutual
agreements about their multi-agent commitments because the partial plans can change so fluidly and also because it
takes time to propagate changes.
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agent indicates it will work in a particular region of the search space, it is important to honour that
commitment - failure to do so will result in misleading information being spread around the
network and incoherent problem solving. However, as with the other approaches, commitments
should not be irrevocable; some form of convention is needed for monitoring their progression.
With the PGP approach, for example, agents often altered their local plans, either because new
tasks arrived or because actions took longer than expected, and so their commitments needed to
be updated. However if agents informed each other of every minor change in their commitments,
it could cause a chain-reaction which spreads throughout the system. Therefore agents adopted an
implicit convention in which they informed their acquaintances only when the deviations were
deemed significant.
4.3 Multi-Agent Planning
With this approach to coordination, agents usually form a multi-agent plan which specifies all of
their future actions and interactions with respect to achievement of a particular objective. It
details, before execution commences, the areas of the search space that will be traversed and the
route to be taken at each decision point for each agent involved in the activity. Multi-agent plans
are typically built to avoid inconsistent or conflicting actions, particularly with respect to
consumption of scarce resources.
Multi-agent planning differs from organisational structuring and meta-level information
exchange in terms of the level of detail to which it specifies every agent’s activities. Agents know
in advance exactly what actions they will take, what actions their acquaintances will take and
what interactions will occur. By requiring such a complete specification of behaviour, the plans
can only realistically have a short time horizon because of problems with the unpredictability and
dynamicity of events in the environment. As plan construction has to take into account all the
possible choice points the agent would have reached, without the benefit of constraining
information from actual execution, this approach often requires substantially more computational
and communication resource than the other two mechanisms.
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There are two basic approaches to multi-agent planning: centralised and distributed. Georgeff
(1983) developed a system in which the plans of individual agents were developed separately and
then sent to a central coordinator who analysed them to identify potential interactions. The
coordinator identified interactions which could cause conflicts and grouped together sequences of
unsafe situations to create critical regions. Finally it inserted communication commands into the
individual plans so that agents synchronise their activities appropriately. Cammarata et al. (1983)
have devised a centralised multi-agent planning system for air traffic control. Each aircraft (agent)
sends the coordinator information about its intended actions. The coordinator then builds a plan
which specifies all of the agents’ actions, including the actions that they, or some other node,
should take to avoid collisions.
With distributed multi-agent planning, the plan is developed by several agents. This means
there may be no one individual which has a global view of the community’s activities, hence
detecting and resolving undesirable interactions becomes significantly more difficult. Corkill
(1979) has developed a distributed hierarchical planner based on NOAH (Sacerdoti, 1977) where
agents represent each other using MODEL nodes and plan execution is coordinated by using
explicit synchronisation primitives. Rosenschein and Genesereth (1985) use a logic-based
approach to study how agents with a common goal, but different local information, can exchange
information to converge on identical plans.
Once a plan has been devised, the agents involved are committed to performing the specified
actions. If they believed that their acquaintances are unlikely to keep their pledges, then they
would not enter the planning phase in the first place because it is such a resource consuming
activity. Commitments are, therefore, the foundation of this approach. There is no latitude for
deviation from the agreed course of action because it may introduce resource conflicts or other
undesirable side-effects which would impair the community’s performance. However the
situation may change so radically between generation and execution that if the plan was
performed the benefit would be negligible or even negative. In this case it is worth entering a
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replanning phase to produce a more profitable alternative (Kambhampati and Hendler, 1992;
Pollack, 1993). Hence there is a need for conventions to determine when replanning is necessary
and whether the existing plan should be reused or whether a fresh plan should be devised.
5 Conclusions
Coordinating the activities of multiple problem solvers is widely regarded as the central problem
of DAI research. To be successful a given mechanism requires three facets to be present (Durfee
et al., 1989): (i) a structure within which agents can interact in predictable ways; (ii) flexibility so
that agents can operate in dynamic environments and can cope with their inherently partial and
imprecise view of the community; (iii) appropriate knowledge and reasoning capabilities to
intelligently use the structure and flexibility. The Centrality of Commitments and Conventions
Hypothesis deals with the first two points. Commitments provide the predictability which agents
need to reason about when assessing their role and the role of others in the community.
Conventions acknowledge that agents need to respond flexibly, both in their local problem solving
and in their interactions towards others, to evolving circumstances. The final feature is not a
matter of coordination per se; rather it is a factor of the ability of an individual to reason about
information and predictions when making decisions about its local problem solving. The aim
being to gain the maximum benefit from social interactions while simultaneously contributing to
the overall effectiveness of the community.
To argue the case for the Centrality of Commitments and Conventions Hypothesis, the process
of coordination was framed in terms of a distributed goal search problem. Using this
representation, the fundamental nature of commitments and conventions were demonstrated for a
variety of goal-subgoal relationships and goal dependency types. Commitments and joint
commitments were presented as fundamental concepts, related to other aspects of an agent’s
mental state, but not reducible to them. The sole distinguishing characteristic between joint and
individual commitments is that the former requires a minimal social convention to ensure the
group’s status is shared amongst its members; the latter places no restrictions on its associated
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conventions.
Recognising commitments and conventions as distinct concepts has the advantage that
different types of social system can be represented simply by modifying the convention which is
used. The concept of commitment is standard in all applications. Interpretations of higher level
semantic notions such as intelligence and rationality can then be encoded using the conventions.
In previous work, commitments and conventions were often intertwined and confused with these
higher level definitions. The demarcation also highlights the fact that there will be two main
sources of agent interaction once the goal tree has been established. One form of interaction will
be related to the goal-subgoal relationships and the interagent goal dependencies; the other will be
through the specified actions of the conventions. Both of these forms correspond to a different
type of social interaction and so provide an aid for structuring the ongoing work related to the
types of communication and social processes which are appropriate in different circumstances.
The review of those coordination models which explicitly encode commitments and
conventions revealed that the majority of the formalisms concentrate on the notion of
commitment, there has been significantly less explicit work on conventions. Three other major
coordination mechanisms (organisational structuring, meta-level information exchange and multi-
agent planning) were also analysed and their success in producing coherent group behaviour was
attributed to the degree of commitment they provide. They represented commitments over varying
time horizons (organisations long term, multi-agent plans short term) and of varying levels of
detail (from the approximate distribution of tasks present in the organisational structure to the
precise details of each agents’ actions in multi-agent plans). Again these mechanisms have paid
less attention to explicit conventions.
The framework presented here represents an initial step towards a canonical theory of DAI
based upon the concepts of commitments and conventions. However much work still needs to be
done to draw together the diverse strands into an integrated and complete description of multi-
agent behaviour. Some of this work needs to address basic methodological shortcomings:
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• The formal theories need to use concepts and languages which can more easily be
mapped into computational systems.
• Clear functional and implementation architectures based on the social roles sketched out
for commitments and conventions need to be devised.
• Richer multi-agent programming languages, which have a firm theoretical underpinning,
need to be developed.
Other work is also needed to clarify the open issues which still surround the commitment and
convention framework. Key questions which need to be answered include:
• What mechanisms can be employed to force agents to honour their commitments or to
stick to their conventions?
• What are the key domain parameters which determine the appropriate balance between
predictability and flexibility to be designed into the conventions?
• How can agents coordinate their behaviour effectively without requiring full mutual
belief of each others’ commitments and conventions?
• What are the most appropriate mechanisms for obtaining agreements about the
conventions to use in a particular situation?
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